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Making Free Trade Fairi

I. Introduction
Philosophers have done very little work on what makes trade fair. Perhaps the most extensive
discussion is Malgorzata Kurjanska and Mathias Risse’s paper, “Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and
the Fair Trade Movement.”ii In their paper, Kurjanska and Risse consider the case for trade subsidies and
the Fair Trade movement. They suggest that it is not permissible for developed countries to give their
producers subsidies because doing so does not strike an appropriate balance between meeting the needs of
the global poor while protecting domestic workers. iii Kurjanska and Risse also argue that the case for Fair
Trade hinges, primarily, on whether or not it is part of the best development strategy for poor countries.
They do not think Fair Trade is part of the best development strategy and, so, they believe purchasing Fair
Trade certified goods is only acceptable because doing so does not constitute a large share of the market in
traded goods. This paper argues that the case against subsidies and Fair Trade Kurjanska and Risse present
is much weaker than they make out. To the contrary, it argues that giving some subsidies and purchasing
some Fair Trade certified goods may even be necessary to make trade fair. Section II starts by saying a few
words about the normative framework Kurjanska and Risse adopt. Section III reviews their arguments.
Section IV tries to show that Kurjansk and Risse have not provided the requisite evidence to make their
case for free trade. Section V suggests that giving some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade certified
goods may be morally required. Section VI concludes.
II. Fairness
Kurjanska and Risse want to know what makes trade fair. So, they consider the nature of fairness.
On Kurjanska and Risse’s account, fairness is a matter of distributive and/or procedural justice. There are
many ways to assess distributions and procedures. Some distributions or procedures give everyone equal
opportunity, maximize the amount of resources people posses, or minimize the amount harm or disutility in
a situation. Fairness, however, is more specific than distributive or procedural justice. A concern for
fairness is a concern for what people are due. Charity, Kurjanska and Risse specify, cannot be fair or unfair
because no one is owed charity. Furthermore, they go on, fairness aims at appropriate satisfaction of
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individuals’ claims; we must know how to fulfill different individuals’ claims appropriately to know what
fairness requires.
There are many theories about what people are due and how to satisfy competing claims
appropriately.iv Utilitarians, for instance, believe that people have an equal claim to the satisfaction of their
interests or the promotion of their welfare. Utilitarians believe appropriately satisfying interests requires
maximizing collective (aggregated) well being. For utilitarians, “fairness talk supervenes on talk of
aggregate utility.”v Deontologists (and other kinds of consequentialists) have more complicated theories.
Often deontologists (and non-utilitarian consequentialists) provide complicated metrics for appropriately
comparing individuals’ competing claims.vi
Kurjanska and Risse accept a deontological theory on which people have claims to the satisfaction
of their needs, to what they are entitled, and to what they deserve. They suggest that, once we have a way
of comparing desert-, need-, and entitlement-based claims, we should “satisfy claims within each category
proportionately.”vii They do not give a general analysis of how to do this, however. Kurjanska and Risse
only say that “one way of thinking of proportionality is to hand the object [that satisfies individuals’
claims] to individuals for time periods proportionate to the strength of their claim[s].” viii They indicate later
that they assume a (statist) Rawlsian liberal egalitarian framework on which countries are obligated to
ensure that their citizens all have equal opportunities and inequalities in the distribution of resources
redound to the advantage of the least well off. They also imply that developed countries have some duties
to the global poor that are quite demanding but do not provide a general way of balancing the claims of the
global poor against the claims of developed countries’ citizens. Let us assume here, however, that
Kurjanska and Risse’s claims about fairness are correct, insofar as they go, and turn to their arguments
against subsidies and Fair Trade.ix
III. Outline of Kurjanska and Risse’s Argument
Subsidies
Kurjanska and Risse consider two arguments for subsidies: individual-claims-based and
collective-preference-based arguments. On the individual-claims-based argument, producers may claim
compensatory subsidies when they are harmed by free trade. They may claim protection from competition
to maintain their chosen line of work. Suppose that, with free trade, French farmers cannot compete with
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Thai farmers. On the individual-claims-based argument, French farmers can argue that their interests are
being sacrificed for the aggregate and demand compensation for their losses.
Kurjanska and Risse think that the individual-claims-based argument fails because producers do
not have a claim to subsidies within a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian framework. Rather, Kurjanska and Risse
believe workers only have a claim to general economic support in times of need. They say that in very
highly structured command-and-control economies the individual-claims based argument might go through.
These highly structured states give their workers legitimate expectations of being able to continue in their
particular line of work. In most countries, however, Kurjanska and Risse do not think workers can demand
subsidies.
On the collective-preference-based argument for subsidies, countries should get to express their
preferences by subsidizing the production of whatever goods they value. The French might, for instance,
prefer “baguette from French grain, camembert from French cows, and foie gras from French ducks.” x
Subsidizing French farmers may be necessary to preserve French culture or to minimize the environmental
costs of long distance transport. If the French are willing to accept the dead-weight losses these subsidies
bring, they might insist that the subsidies are acceptable. xi
Kurjanska and Risse do not believe that the collective-preference-based argument for subsidies is
any more successful than the individual-claims-based argument. They argue that the (moral) losses to nonproducers from subsidies may outweigh the gains to producers. xii In particular, Kurjanska and Risse claim
that if free trade is essential for growth and development, “trade-liberalization becomes mandatory for
developed countries.”xiii As long as poverty alleviation “bears more weight than cultural preservation…
attempts at preservation ought not to be trade-distorting.” xiv If, for instance, the French want to support their
farmers, they have to use non-trade distorting measures. xv Kurjanska and Risse think this is a good way of
balancing (proportionately) citizens’ claims against the claims of the needy. xvi Perhaps this is because
distortions usually result in net losses and Kurjanska and Risse think 1) the gains we will see by using nondistorting measures will generally accrue to the needy and 2) non-trade distorting measures will protect
citizens’ most important interests, even if some workers have to switch industries.
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Very likely, Kurjanska and Risse would also object to subsides not intended to 1) help the poor or
2) meet other moral objectives. For, in the companion article to “Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and
the Fair Trade Movement,” Risse explicitly rejects protectionist subsidies that are ill intentioned.
Kurjanska and Risse think their arguments support some of the current rules of trade embodied in
the World Trade Organization (WTO). In particular, Kurjanska and Risse believe the WTO is right to reject
export subsidies but accept other kinds of producer support. xvii Kurjanska and Risse recognize that some
export subsidies may harm poor producers by increasing low-price competition for their products but they
point out that this can have compensating advantages for the poor. The French may, for instance, subsidize
technological research intended to benefit French farmers that benefit poor Thai farmers too.
Kurjanska and Risse also recognize that the growth free trade brings may benefit some poor
people more than others. If, for instance, agricultural trade is liberalized, many poor net food importing
countries may do worse because they have to pay higher prices for food. xviii Hence, Kurjanska and Risse
conclude, there is reason to redistribute the benefits of free trade. Kurjanska and Risse think that such
redistribution will be difficult because there are so many countries trading with each other and, so, do not
suggest any practical way of doing so.
Fair Trade
In the second half of “Fairness in Trade II: Export Subsidies and the Fair Trade Movement”
Kurjanska and Risse consider the case for purchasing Fair Trade certified products. To qualify as Fair
Trade certified, laborers must be paid prices or given wages “sufficient to make a living.” xix Often
producers also receive financial and technical assistance, price support, and loans. xx “In respect to products
largely grown by small farmers, price is the concern. If the product is grown on large estates, the focus falls
on wages and working conditions.”xxi Finally, Fair Trade goods may have to be made in good working
conditions in an environmentally sustainable way. xxii
As with arguments for subsidies, Kurjanska and Risse object to both individual-claims-based and
collective-preference-based arguments for Fair Trade. On the individual-claims-based arguments for Fair
Trade producers have a claim to Fair Trade standards when they are harmed by free trade. Poor producers
might argue, for instance, that free trade makes it difficult for them to secure a living wage or decent
working conditions and request compensation.
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Kurjanska and Risse argue, however, that consumers should be concerned about whether or not
Fair Trade is the best development strategy for poor countries, not whether it helps poor producers. They
are not as clear as one might like about the relationship that must obtain between Fair Trade and
development. It is pretty clear, however, that they think Fair Trade purchases can generally be justified
only if they are part of the best development strategy. They say “the challenge for Fair Trade advocates
remains that theirs may not be the most promising development strategy.” xxiii Fair Trade may not work, for
instance, in oppressive regimes; a better way to help poor people may be to work to end the oppression.
Furthermore, Kurjanska and Risse think that Fair Trade may not be the best development strategy because
it may induce poor people to specialize in ways that are not in their long term interests. To support this
point, they offer the case of Costa Rica. Costa Rica successfully promoted development by moving away
from producing goods associated with Fair Trade. They say that:
In Costa Rica a focus on new exports and eco-tourism allowed for diversification away
from coffee and bananas. The export share of non-traditional products rose from 38.6%
in 1982 to 87% in 2003. Consumers who would have supported Fair Trade with regard to
coffee and bananas in Costa Rica would have resisted a shift that in the long run turned
out for the better. (One may even argue that providing opportunities for farmers to
transition out of farming improved the lot of those who entered a new more profitable
and less volatile sector. Moreover, by decreasing production of bananas, it increased
returns for those who retained their business. It can be asserted that by providing aid and
higher than market price returns to those who can obtain its label, it simultaneously
provides incentives for others to continue in or even enter an unprofitable market with
hopes to gain access to the limited Fair Trade market.)xxiv
Kurjanska and Risse believe Fair Trade may be acceptable under some conditions. It might, for instance, be
help address injustices that primarily make producers worse off. Alternately, Fair Trade may be acceptable
if there is nothing better we can do for a country – if, for instance, we cannot help a country’s workers
transition into a better industry. But Kurjanska and Risse do not think Fair Trade can generally be justified.
On the collective-preference-based argument for Fair Trade, people should be free to make their
own purchasing decisions and express their preferences for some goods over others. People should get to
choose Fair Trade certified over regular goods because Fair Trade goods are different than regular goods.
The thought is that Fair Trade goods are produced in a different, more ethical, way than otherwise
equivalent regular goods; and, because the process of production is part of the product, Fair Trade goods
are not the same as regular goods. On the collective-preference-based argument, consumers should be free
to purchase Fair Trade goods that are not made under duress or in terrible working conditions. xxv
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Kurjanska and Risse are not convinced. They do not think Fair Trade bananas are really different
from regular bananas because they have different moral characteristics. xxvi Furthermore, they think that,
although the Fair Trade certified banana-production processes may be fairer, purchasing Fair Trade
bananas may lead to a less fair world over time. Consumer choice is not more important than pursing the
best development strategy for the poor.
In short, Kurjanska and Risse do not think purchasing Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best
development strategy. So, they conclude that it is only permissible to buy Fair Trade certified goods
because there is no reason to think purchasing Fair Trade goods will have a real impact in any case; Fair
Trade does not have a large enough market share to matter.xxvii
IV. Critique of Kurjanska and Risse’s Argument
This section takes issue with Kurjanska and Risse’s arguments against (most) subsidies and Fair
Trade. It does not question Kurjanska and Risse’s claim that liberalization promotes growth and
development. Nor does it question Kurjanska and Risse’s claim that developed countries are obligated to
give priority to helping poor countries develop. Rather this section questions Kurjanska and Risse’s
argument that free trade is not part of the best development strategy. When Kurjanska and Risse talk about
subsidies, their argument rests on some undefended empirical claims about the growth and incentive effects
of free trade vs. different kinds of subsidies. The data does not support their case -- even subsidies that are
not backed by the best intentions may be part of the best development strategy. When Kurjanska and Risse
talk about Fair Trade, they only provide theoretical reason to think that Fair Trade is not part of the best
development strategy. Theoretical argument cannot make this case, empirical evidence is necessary; it is
possible to give a theoretical argument for Fair Trade being part of the best development strategy as strong
as the argument against this conclusion Kurjanska and Risse offer. So, since Kurjanska and Risse do not
provide the requisite empirical evidence to show that (most) subsidies and Fair Trade are not part of the
best development strategy; they have not made their case for free trade.
Before beginning, however, it is worth noting a general problem with Kurjanska and Risse’s
arguments. A Rawlsian framework does not apply to policies (let alone consumer choice!) directly but to
institutions.xxviii There are significant problems for trying to evaluate policies in isolation using a Rawlsian
framework.xxix Even if a sate’s policy seems to maximize the position of that state’s least well off subjects, a

6

different policy might bring greater gains to these subjects if background policies are changed. Even
policies that seem to harm the least well off may be required because they, in combination with a different
set of policies maximize the position of the least well off. The relevant analysis is probably too complicated
to carry out. This provides one reason to think that it is hard, if not impossible, to figure out what the best
development strategy is in general. Hopefully this will become clear below. But the following arguments
should stand alone, even if this worry can be averted.xxx
Subsidies
Kurjanska and Risse do not specify exactly what they intend to count as a subsidy. In the
economic literature many kinds of governmental support to a producers count as subsidies. xxxi But because
Kurjanska and Risse end up defending something like the WTO’s policy on subsidies we might begin by
reflecting on what the WTO says about subsidies. The WTO specifies that “there are two general types of
subsidies: export and domestic. An export subsidy is a benefit conferred on a firm by the government that is
contingent on exports. A domestic subsidy is a benefit not directly linked to exports.” xxxii As we have
already seen, Kurjanska and Risse seem to be most concerned about export subsidies because they believe
these subsidies are more trade distorting than other kinds of domestic producer support. So, in responding
to their arguments this section will focus primarily on showing that some export subsidies are acceptable.
The arguments below should also apply more broadly, however.
There are a few reasons why the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be acceptable. First,
Kurjanska and Risse do not provide the requisite evidence to show that because free trade “plays a crucial
role for growth” and development, “trade-liberalization becomes mandatory for developed countries.” xxxiii
Second, Kurjanska and Risse do not provide the requisite evidence to show that the subsides they reject are
more trade-distorting than the subsidies they prefer. Third, even if the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject
are more trade distorting than those they prefer, the subsidies they reject may be the most effective way to
help poor countries develop in our non-ideal world. Let us consider each of these points in turn. We will
then provide a further argument to show that the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may (1) have a role
to play in ensuring that compensation is provided to poor losers from liberalization even if (2) they are not
backed by the best intentions. Although concern for the poor may function as a cover for subsidies that do
not benefit (or even harm) the poor, institutional mechanisms might prevent such abuse. This final
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argument may indirectly help support the claim that the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be the
most effective way to help poor countries develop in our non-ideal world.
Recall that Kurjanska and Risse start by assuming a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian framework on
which developed countries are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop. xxxiv They then
note that there is a good deal of evidence that free trade “plays a crucial role for growth as well as for other
desirable goals of development, such as those listed as the U.N. Millennium Goals.” xxxv Kurjanska and
Risse cannot, however, conclude from this, as they try to do, that “trade-liberalization becomes mandatory
for developed countries.”xxxvi Trade may lead to growth in many ways. Some ways of increasing growth
may help poor countries and the poor within them, others do not. xxxvii Countries can grow, for instance, if
only the rich become better off. xxxviii Similarly, although free trade probably does help some countries meet
other important development goals, Kurjanska and Risse must show more than this. To show that free trade
is required of developed countries, they must argue that free trade is the best way of meeting these goals;
they must show that it is not better to allow some of the subsidies they reject. Free trade may not be the
best way of helping poor countries develop.
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that states should protect their citizens against the fortitudes of the
market with production subsidies because production subsides are not trade-distorting, while most other
subsides distort trade and result in net losses. They do not defend their claim that production subsides are
not trade-distorting while most other subsides distort trade and result in net losses. And there is little reason
to believe this. Some argue, for instance, that many of the subsidies that are legal under the WTO,
including those Kurjanska and Risse prefer, are trade-distorting and, more to the point, some argue that the
subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer are bad for the poor. xxxix These subsidies may even be worse for the
poor than the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject. Some of the subsides Kurjanska and Risse are objecting
to may be no more distorting than production subsidies and, even if the subsides Kurjanska and Risse reject
do result in a net loss, they may not only help rich workers but may be the best way to help the poor. In our
imperfect world, the needy may gain more from distortions than they would gain from unrestricted free
tradexl (and distortions may not make it more difficult for countries to protect their citizens against the
fortitudes of the market). What kinds of market reforms are best probably depends on a variety of factors. It
may matter, for instance, how easily employers can substitute one kind of labor (e.g. high skill) for another
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(e.g. low skill) in the production process. xli And, there is even evidence that, under some conditions, export
subsides can be more efficient than the production subsidies Kurjanska and Risse seem to prefer. xlii
Furthermore, even if the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject are the most trade-distorting, and
trade-distorting subsidies are rarely one of the best ways to help poor countries develop in theory, we do
not live in a perfect world. There may be reasons of political economy to use such subsidies rather than
other market reforms to help these countries.xliiiIt may be easier, for instance, to get developed countries or
corporate producers to reduce poverty through the threat of export subsidies than through taxes or other
market reforms. There may even be some cases where the only realistic way to reduce poverty is to threaten
to use trade-distorting subsidies to get countries to stop decimating their populations or ignoring the basic
needs of their citizens. Such threats may be essential in getting some countries to agree to international
development treaties, for instance. There may also be few other ways to punish those who do not live up to
their commitment not to harm the poor.xliv
None of this means that allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject will more effectively
help the poor than only allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer. It is entirely possible, for
instance, that only allowing the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse prefer may be best for the poor even if there
are some costs to allowing those subsidies. xlv The point is just that Kurjanska and Risse have not given us
any reason to think that it is best to only allow the subsidies they prefer. In the absence of (extremely
difficult, if not impossible, to collect) empirical evidence about what actually best fulfills our moral
obligations, liberal egalitarians have no reason to reject all export subsidies but allow other kinds of
producer support. Export subsidies may sometimes be required. Other kinds of producer support may
sometimes be unjustifiable. Kurjanska and Risse have not made their case against the subsidies they reject.
Liberalization may not be mandatory and (even trade-distorting) subsidies may sometimes be appropriate.
So, it is not clearly acceptable for the WTO to generally reject export subsidies but allow other kinds of
producer support.
It is possible to put the point in a way that Kurjanska and Risse might find more appealing.
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that we need to make sure that whatever free trade occurs brings fair benefits
to the poor. They note that the growth free trade brings may benefit some more than others and may even
cause some problems for the poor. They suggest, for instance, that we must ensure that even net food
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importing countries benefit from free trade for trade to be fair. As Kurjanska and Risse intimate, one
possibility is to use some of the gains from trade amongst WTO member countries to compensate the
poorest countries when they are hurt by free trade. But the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject may be the
best way to compensate poor countries.
One way to make sure trade benefits the poor is to restructure the rules of global trade so that they
proactively reduce poverty. Christian Barry and Sanjay Reddy argue, for instance, that trade liberalization
and agreements to improve labor standards and wages in developing countries should be linked. xlvi At least,
they argue, linkage may be a good idea if it “…arises from a fair process of negotiation between states, is
transparent and rule-based, is applied in a manner that reflects the level of development of a country,
incorporates adequate international burden-sharing, and takes appropriate account of viewpoints within
each country.”xlvii Their arguments are cogent and compelling.xlviii Linkage may rely on the threat of trade
policies (including the subsidies) that Kurjanska and Risse reject to get countries to stop violating labor and
wage standards.xlix
So, one might conclude, subsidies intended to help the global poor, whatever their nature, are only
justifiable if they are part of the best development strategy. But, I do not think this goes far enough.
Subsidies should not be prohibited just because they are intended to be protectionist. Although Kurjanska
and Risse would probably object to this claim, what matters, primarily, is what works. l
Perhaps Kurjanska and Risse could argue against ill-intentioned subsidies, in particular, as
follows. Kurjanska and Risse might note that people may disingenuously cite poverty alleviation
(appropriately balanced against the needs of domestic trade-displaced workers) as a reason for protectionist
measures. Producers or consumers seeking protection from competition may take advantage of wellintentioned concern about poverty to gain economic benefits for themselves. Ethanol producers might, for
instance, cite worries about the food security of net food importing countries as a reason for subsidizing US
corn production.li So, Kurjanska and Risse might conclude that ill intentioned subsidies are impermissible.
This is not compelling. Some collusion between self-interested producers or consumers and those
who genuinely care about world poverty may not be bad. It may be possible to build coalitions of those
who care about the global poor and those seeking protection (this is likely as the groups are not mutually
exclusive).lii It may then be possible to adopt appropriate trade policy more quickly. If the global poor will
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benefit appropriately from keeping corn prices low, it may be acceptable for ethanol producers to try to
secure subsidies. The best development strategy may allow ill intentioned subsidies.
Still, it is clear that there may be a problem. Concern for the poor may function as a cover for
subsidies that do not benefit (or even harm) the poor. Low corn prices may not even help those who are
currently poor in aggregate and the environmental effects of ethanol may be devastating for poor people in
future generations. Advocates of the poor may even be fooled into supporting such harmful subsidies.
Fortunately, there are a few ways we might address this problem. One is through the dispute
resolution panels of international trade agreements like the WTO. These panels may develop standards for
judging whether subsidies will actually reduce poverty appropriately (in light of the needs of tradedisplaced workers). If proposed measures to benefit the poor do not benefit the poor appropriately then,
unless there is another reason to implement such measures, they should be prohibited. liii Educating those
who care about the poor so that they will not be fooled into supporting inappropriate trade policies may
also help prevent such exploitation. Of course, it is risky to allow ill intentioned subsidies. But, the fact that
such protectionism can hurt the poor does not tell against allowing even ill-intentioned subsides when they
best promote development.
Trade-liberalization is not mandatory for developed countries even if it promotes growth and
development and developed countries are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop.
Contra Kurjanska and Risse, allowing even ill-intentioned subsidies may even be the best way of ensuring
that the poor benefit fairly from trade.
Fair Trade
Many of the above points regarding subsidies also apply to Kurjanska and Risse’s arguments
against Fair Trade. So, this subsection will not reiterate them. Rather, it will raise some additional concerns
about Kurjanska and Risse’s arguments.liv In some respects, Kurjanska and Risse’s argument against Fair
Trade is stronger than they make out. Kurjanska and Risse suggest that it is permissible to buy Fair Trade if
there is no reason to think it will have a large negative impact on the poor. Fair Trade is not big business.
Sales of Fair Trade coffee, for instance, total only 87 million dollars a year which is a fraction of the world
trade in coffee.lv So, they conclude, it is only permissible for people to purchase Fair Trade certified goods
(from a first person perspective) because the potential harm from purchasing Fair Trade certified goods is
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minimal and doing so benefits someone immediately. Kurjanska and Risse’s argument on this point is not
compelling from a Rawlsian liberal egalitarian perspective, however. Although Fair Trade goods make up a
small proportion of all traded goods, purchasing Fair Trade could hinder development and, if so, Rawlsian
liberal egalitarians should believe it is impermissible to purchase these goods. If Fair Trade is not part of
the best development strategy for the poor, it is unacceptable.
Kurjanska and Risse suggest that Fair Trade is not part of the best development strategy because
people may be induced to specialize in ways that do not support their long term interests. To arrive at this
conclusion Kurjanska and Risse do not cite rigorous empirical evidence. Instead they posit a counterfactual hypothesis about how Fair Trade would have impacted Costa Rica. But even if Costa Rica is better
off than it would have been had it embraced Fair Trade that cannot show that Fair Trade is generally worse
than free trade for the poor. Costa Rica may be an exception, most other countries that increase their Fair
Trade markets may benefit.
Furthermore, it is easy to construct a compelling theoretical argument for the conclusion that Fair
Trade will make some poor people better off without making any of them worse off. It is even possible to
give a theoretical argument that purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best development
strategy.
Consider, first, how Fair Trade might make some poor people better off without making any of
them worse of. In particular, consider how a consumers’ buying Fair Trade bananas (for instance) is always
better for the poor than buying non-Fair Trade bananas. To make this argument, let us (1) make the
standard economic assumptionslvi and assume that (2) some of the profit from making Fair Trade rather
than regular bananas is passed on to the poor, (3) consumers do not change the amount of bananas they
purchase, and (4) consumers will continue to buy Fair Trade bananas into perpetuity. lvii
Suppose a consumer will either purchase bananas from a Fair Trade source for (say) $2 a bag or
non-Fair Trade source for $1 a bag. If the consumer buys from a Fair Trade source the poor people who
receive her money would, without her money, either have gone out of business or not. If the poor people
she supports would otherwise have gone out of business they would have either gone into a more profitable
business (than the regular banana business) or not. If not, then the consumer has benefited them. If the poor
people the consumer supports would have otherwise gone into a more profitable business (say sugar) then
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they have done better to make Fair Trade bananas, otherwise they would have gone into sugar. lviii The poor
people this consumer supports are, thus, better off with Fair Trade.
The only problem arises if, after the consumer starts buying Fair Trade, she 1) stops buying Fair
Trade or 2) buys fewer bananas total. Suppose she buys the same amount of bananas but only buys Fair
Trade for a while before reverting to normal bananas. When she buys Fair Trade she creates an incentive
for farmers to produce Fair Trade bananas. When she stops buying Fair Trade certified bananas, however,
the Fair Trade farmer she was supporting may do worse. It depends on whether this farmer, losing business,
reverts to normal practices, goes over to sugar, or is unable to transition and ends up out of business
altogether. Perhaps in the interim a better opportunity than sugar has arisen (say, tourism). Everyone,
including the farmer who grows the consumer’s Fair Trade bananas for a while, may be better off.
Suppose that, instead, the consumer buys fewer bananas. Then the consumer supports fewer
people. Before switching to Fair Trade, she might have spent two dollars a week on bananas and supported
two farmers who each make one bag a week. If she only buys one bag of Fair Trade bananas instead
(because, say, she only wants to spend $2 on bananas) then the Fair Trade farmer does better, but the other
farmer may lose all income. This will not happen in all circumstances, though. Suppose, for instance, that,
with the decline of the normal banana business, there is only room for one farmer to profit by moving into
sugar. If the consumer starts buying Fair Trade, the poor farmer who chooses to make Fair Trade bananas
because it is his or her best option, might otherwise have gone into sugar. But, if so, that farmer benefits –
otherwise the farmer would make sugar instead. Furthermore, there is now room for the banana farmer who
would otherwise have been stuck making regular bananas to profit by moving into sugar. Both of the
farmers the consumer supports before purchasing Fair Trade benefit.
Of course, if the consumer does not buy fewer bananas, the extra money the consumer spends on
Fair Trade bananas must come from somewhere. If the consumer stops buying papayas from an equally
poor person she may harm some poor people while helping other poor people by buying Fair Trade. If,
instead, the consumer just works a bit harder to get the extra money she needs, or stops purchasing
something that only impacts rich people then the net impact of her action may be good for the poor.
In any case, if this argument’s assumptions hold and consumers continue to buy the same amount
of Fair Trade certified goods into perpetuity, consumers may not harm the poor and will benefit some by
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purchasing Fair Trade.lix Fair Trade farmers will do better and some of the normal farmers may even be
able to transition into sugar. (Though, of course, consumers might be able to help the poor more with the
money they use to buy Fair Trade bananas). If there is no better way to help the poor, purchasing some Fair
Trade bananas may be part of the best development strategy.
But we can go further. Purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods might even be part of the best
development strategy (on Kurjanska and Risse’s somewhat vague Rawlsian account). Fair Trade might, for
instance, help bring about a general increase in production standards. If bananas have to be Fair Trade
certified to compete, for instance, that would greatly improve many poor peoples’ lives. So, even on
Kurjanska and Risse’s account, Fair Trade might be morally required.
Now Kurjanska and Risse would probably point out that, in reality, markets are not perfect. So,
despite the theoretical possibility outlined above, Fair Trade may actually induce people to specialize in
ways that do not support their long term interests. Given the transition costs, farmers who start producing
Fair Trade goods may not be able to stop producing them and move into more profitable industries if
demand for Fair Trade goods eventually falls or better opportunities arise. lx
But if this is Kurjanska and Risse’s idea, then they must agree that what we really need to decide
the issue is more empirical evidence. And, even if they would not respond in this way, it should be clear
that such evidence is necessary. It is much too easy to come up with speculative theoretical arguments for
and against Fair Trade. But Kurjanska and Risse do not provide any empirical evidence. So Kurjanska and
Risse cannot conclude that Fair Trade is not part of the best development strategy for the poor. Of course,
Kurjanska and Risse might be right that Fair Trade is not part of the best development strategy. But they
have not made this case. As with subsidies, we probably lack the information necessary to determine
whether Fair Trade is the best development strategy. Without this information, Kurjanska and Risse’s
argument is much weaker than they make out. The next section will go further, however, to argue that
giving some of the subsidies Kurjanska and Risse reject and purchasing some Fair Trade goods may even
be morally required.
V. Deciding About Development in the Absence of Good Evidence
So far, this paper has suggested that Kurjanska and Risse’s arguments are not as strong as they
make out. Their arguments do not show that trade-liberalization is mandatory. Perhaps Kurjanska and Risse
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do not offer the requisite evidence that their preferred strategy is best because it would be very difficult, if
not impossible, to figure out what the best development strategy is in general. It is possible to argue,
however, that in the absence of empirical evidence making Kurjanska and Risse’s case, it is morally
acceptable to give some of the subsidies they reject (henceforth, simply, subsidies) and purchase some Fair
Trade certified goods. For, this section will suggest that when we disaggregate the effects of subsidies and
Fair Trade, there is reason to believe that purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods and giving some
subsidies can help the poor. Let us consider the case for purchasing some Fair Trade goods first because it
requires the most argument.
Fair Trade
Recall the claim underlying many of Kurjanska and Risse conclusions: Fair Trade is morally
acceptable only if it is part of the best development strategy. If it is possible to do so, we should probably
try to figure out whether purchasing any Fair Trade certified goods is part of the best development strategy.
But it is very difficult if not impossible to determine what the best development strategy is in general.
Hence, the fact that we do not know that a strategy is best is not a reason against pursing it. If, on the other
hand, we have reason to think a strategy will help some poor people and do not have reason to think the
strategy will harm more than help the poor, there is reason to use that strategy. Such a strategy may even be
morally required.
Although the picture is not always rosy and Fair Trade may sometimes fail to improve incomes,
for instance, there is evidence that Fair Trade can bring many benefits to poor people in developing
countries.lxi As one Fair Trade coffee farmer reported:
Before, life was very hard for us, mainly because we could never get a decent price for
our coffee. Now we have our own export co-op, and we sell to the Fair Trade market.
Fair Trade gives us a fair price and access to credit. It also gives us dignity. We are
treated as equals.lxii
Empirical research supports this contention. Impact assessments of Fair Trade projects suggest that they
benefit the poor by raising prices for Fair Trade goods. lxiii In “Assessing the Potential of Fair Trade for
Poverty Reduction and Conflict Prevention: A Case Study of Bolivian Coffee Producers” Sandra Imhof and
Andrew Lee use quantitative and qualitative data to argue, for instance, that Fair Trade coffee producers
make more than their competitors.lxiv Others also claim that those who participate in Fair Trade projects
receive higher, less variable prices, credit, and training. lxv In One Cup At A Time: Poverty Alleviation And
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Fair Trade Coffee in Latin America Murray et. al. suggest, for instance, that participation in Fair Trade
networks helps farmers throughout Latin America secure all of these things. lxvi The higher prices they can
secure with Fair Trade can help the poor in many ways. They may simply help farmers make ends meet. In
“Confronting the Coffee Crisis: Can Fair Trade, Organic, and Specialty Coffees Reduce Small-Scale
Farmer Vulnerability in Northern Nicaragua?” Christopher Bacon argues that participating in a Fair Trade
network helps coffee farmers in Nicaragua reduce their vulnerability to the coffee crisis. lxvii He reports that
the Fair Trade farmers in his sample are four times less likely to lose their land than traditional farmers. lxviii
In "Revaluing Peasant Coffee Production: Organic and Fair Trade Markets in Mexico," Muriel Calo and
Timothy A. Wise use theoretical models along with survey data to argue that Fair Trade farmers they
studied end up better off than those who turn to organic production alone. lxix Other researchers suggest that
Fair Trade farmers do better in part because they have more access to credit, training, and support
programs.lxx
There is even evidence that farmers participating in Fair Trade programs are better able to educate
their childrenlxxi and meet their basic needs for things like food, water, and housing. lxxii As another Fair
Trade farmer put it:
The higher price we get when we sell coffee to Cafedirect means that now our
cooperative can afford to pay a doctor who will give treatment to our members. For
myself, the price difference has meant I can afford more food for my family and send my
children to school properly equipped with pens and notebooks for the first time.lxxiii
In short, there is evidence that Fair Trade often helps poor people in developing countries increase their
incomes, meet their basic needs, reduce their vulnerability in times of crisis, and retain their farms. lxxiv
Yet other researchers suggest that there other benefits of participation in Fair Trade
organizations.lxxv As the European Fair Trade Association puts it:
[t]he producer-fair trader relationships usually go beyond just selling and buying, and can
include the joint development of new products or product lines, the adaptation of
products to European fashions, gaining access to new marketing channels, raising
investment or working capital and strengthening or expanding the producer
organization.lxxvi
As Laura Raynolds reports in “Poverty Alleviation Through Fair Trade Coffee Networks: Existing
Research and Critical Issues,” participating in Fair Trade programs can help farmers develop their
organizational capacities within cooperatives. lxxvii Or, as another Fair Trade farmer reports: “We have
gained a much better knowledge of the international market and of course the price is better.” lxxviii Studies
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also suggest that Fair Trade organizations enhance the capacity of participating cooperatives to market their
goodslxxix and have other positive effects on producers because it helps them organize. lxxx In “Coffee, Cooperatives and Competition: The Impact of Fair Trade,” for instance, Anna Milford uses a theoretical
model and case study evidence to argue that the Fair Trade premium helps cooperatives maintain cohesion
and use collective bargaining power to destabilize cartels and secure higher prices for farmers’ products.
Milford suggests that these co-operatives not only improve welfare by providing education and credit
services but by giving farmers essential information and lobbying power. lxxxi
The studies of Fair Trade’s impact discussed above are, of course, open to criticism. In
“Introduction: Impact Evaluation in Official Development Agencies,” Howard White and Michael
Bamberger argue, for instance, that many impact evaluations suffer from selection bias (the bias that results
from differences between the treatment and the comparison groups). Such evaluations may fail to isolate
the cause of Fair Trade farmers’ success. lxxxii They may fail, for instance, to consider whether those who
participate in Fair Trade programs are generally better off than those who do not.
Nevertheless, Fair Trade impact evaluations are becoming more sophisticated all of the time.
Some of the best are quasi-experimental. lxxxiii A recent study commissioned by the Center for International
Development Issues in the Netherlands is particularly comprehensive containing eight case studies looking
at Fair Trade in different commodities in different places. Quasi-experimental studies help test the causal
efficacy of Fair Trade programs to help insure a study’s internal validity. A study of a Fair Trade program’s
efficacy has high internal validity when it captures the causal relationships between the particular aid
program being evaluated and the particular outcome observed (no matter how unique the circumstances of
the study). Unlike experimental studies, Quasi-experimental studies do not try to insure internal validity by
randomly assigning people (or other units of analysis) to treatment groups (e.g. those participating in a Fair
Trade program) and comparison groups (e.g. those not participating). Instead, researchers try to minimize
selection bias in other ways.
An example will help illustrate the advantages and limitations of quasi-experimental studies.
Suppose we want to evaluate a Fair Trade program to see if it decreases infant mortality. If farmers or
researchers decide who gets to participate, there may be a selection bias. Participants may generally be
richer than non-participants and, so, have better access to health care and lower infant mortality rates to
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begin with. Even if participants have lower infant mortality rates than non-participants, researchers will not
know if the program was successful.
Using a quasi-experimental method may help. Consider a simple version of propensity score
matching (as the Center for International Development Issues studies used a variant of this method). With
propensity score matching, researchers select a Fair Trade program and another cooperative or group of
people who are as similar as possible to those in the program. Next, researchers see how people fare, on
average, in the two groups.
To account for differences between those in the groups that are not explained by the Fair Trade
program researchers create “balancing scores” to try to maximize the probability that participants will be
relevantly similar to non-participants. Researchers do propensity score matching. They look at individuals’
observable characteristics (e.g. land holdings, wealth, health status and gender) that might impact program
results. On this basis, they try to figure out what each individual’s probability of participating in a Fair
Trade program would be. The treatment and comparison groups are then made up of people whose
estimated probabilities of participating are as similar as possible.
In the Center for International Development Issues’ study, the researchers used a Probit model to
look at the variables influencing participation in Fair Trade programs. They used economic theory,
previous research, and information about the particular setting to build the model. Researchers compared
participants’ outcomes to those expected to be most similar to them. lxxxiv Then, researchers ran regression
analyses to see whether participation in Fair Trade organizations had a significant impact on productivity,
access to health insurance, credit and so forth. lxxxv They found that the Fair Trade programs they studied
generally increased participants’ food consumption and access to credit. On average, participants made
more housing, land, and educational investments than those in the non-Fair Trade comparison group. lxxxvi
Researchers found that participants were also more willing to accept risk and invest in the future –
behaviors many argue are essential for escaping poverty. lxxxvii Notably, some of the studies even tested for
regional affects of Fair Trade. They found general increases in market prices and wages once Fair Trade
standards made up a significant portion of the market.
Similarly, in “Does Consumption Help Education? The Effect of Fair Trade on Producers' Income
and Schooling Decisions,” Leonardo Becchetti uses relatively sophisticated econometric analysis to control
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for selection bias. He suggests that compared with non-Fair Trade farmers, Fair Trade farmers have greater
bargaining power with intermediaries, receive higher prices, have better production systems, are happier
with the prices they can secure, and have better nutrition and living conditions as well as lower child
mortality.lxxxviii Becchetti also argues that non-Fair Trade farmers can benefit from nearby Fair Trade
projects.lxxxix
The fact that some of the most rigorous studies suggest Fair Trade’s regional effects can be
positive, provides some evidence against Kurjanska and Risse’s claim that Fair Trade will have indirect
negative impacts on non-Fair Trade producers. xc Although Fair Trade may have negative impacts, it is not
guaranteed to do so. Nor have we discovered any evidence that Fair Trade programs generally have
negative impacts.
Although Fair Trade will not help everyone it can certainly benefit some. So, in the absence of
evidence that Fair Trade will harm the poor more than it will help them in all cases (I know of no such
evidence), there is reason to purchase some Fair Trade certified goods. Purchasing some Fair Trade
certified goods (from those projects which do not harm the poor more than they help the poor) may even be
morally required. This conclusion can be strengthened if, as Kurjanska and Risse implicitly admit in
responding to the collective-preference-based argument for Fair Trade, the production processes consumers
support when they purchase Fair Trade certified goods are fairer in themselves than the production
processes consumers support when they purchase regular goods.
Subsidies
Finally, we can provide a similar argument for giving some subsidies. We do not know which, if
any, subsidies are part of the best development strategy. If it is possible to do so, we should probably try to
figure out which, if any, subsidies are part of this strategy. In the absence of this very difficult (if not
impossible) to collect information, however, Kurjanska and Risse should agree that developed countries
have reason to give some subsidies. After all, Kurjanska and Risse implicitly agree that some rich country
subsidies probably help some poor people and there is compelling evidence for this conclusion. xci As they
note, if we liberalize trade in agricultural goods (reducing developed country export subsidies), net food
importing countries will probably have to pay higher prices for food and, if so, will probably do worse. xcii
Many of these countries are poor.xciii Liberalizing trade in Southern Africa’s staple commodities, for
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instance, would probably be devastating for many countries in Southern Africa as many of these countries
are net food importers.xciv So, some of the current (e.g.) export subsidies probably redound to the advantage
of the poorest in these net food importing countries.xcv
Kurjanska and Risse might object that there is a great deal of evidence that “the aggregative
importance of trade for development” is large. xcvi Restricting free trade by offering even some subsidies
may hurt the poor. Subsidies may not be part of the best development strategy.
Kurjanska and Risse cannot rest their case for subsidies on the claim that “the aggregative
importance of trade for development” is large. xcvii This claim cannot show that some subsidies are not part
of the best development strategy. xcviii To reach the conclusion that all subsidies are impermissible,
Kurjanska and Risse would also have to defend the proposition that, everything considered, having some
subsidies will be worse than having none at all. They do not provide this evidence. xcix Otherwise, given that
we have evidence that some subsidies can do some good, there is reason to give some subsidies.c Giving
some subsidies may even be morally required.ci
IV. Conclusion
This paper has taken issue with the main philosophical argument against trade-distorting subsidies
and Fair Trade in the literature. Contra Kurjanska and Risse, it suggested that trade-liberalization is not
mandatory for developed countries even if it promotes growth and development and developed countries
are obligated to give priority to helping poor countries develop. Giving some subsidies may be an
acceptable way to help the poor. Similarly, it may be a good thing if people purchase some Fair Trade
certified goods. Finally, this paper argued that giving some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade
certified goods may even be morally required. Very roughly, it suggested that it would be very difficult, if
not impossible, to figure out what the best development strategy is, in general. So, the fact that we do not
know that a particular development strategy is best is not a reason against pursing it. We have reason to
think giving some subsidies and purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods will help some poor people
and that Fair Trade is fairer in itself. cii We do not have reason to think giving some subsidies and
purchasing some Fair Trade certified goods will harm the poor more than it will help the poor. So, if this
argument goes through, there is reason to give some subsidies and purchase some Fair Trade certified
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goods. We may even be obligated to do so. But, even if this final argument does not go through, the case
against subsidies and Fair Trade Kurjanska and Risse present is much weaker than they make out.
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